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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MICHAEL R. ALLAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
) Case No. 960512-CA 
( Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdictional authority 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(f) of the Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended). 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that Officer 
Moore had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of defendant 
Michael R. Allan's vehicle? 
There are two standards of review, one to the factual 
findings and the other to the conclusion of law. "The trial 
court's factual findings underlying its decision to grant or deny 
a motion to suppress are examined for clear error." State v. 
Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994)). x>[T]he standard to be applied 
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to the conclusion of law, i.e., whether the facts as found give 
rise to reasonable suspicion *is reviewable nondeferentially for 
correctness . . . .' " Ld. (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 939). 
"Nevertheless, the nature of this particular determination of law 
allows the trial court *a measure of discretion . . . when 
applying that standard to a given set of facts.' " Ld. (quoting 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 939) . 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when 
he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Michael R. Allan was arrested March 27, 1995, and 
charged with driving under the influence of alcohol in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44, a Class B misdemeanor. 
Defendant challenged the legality of the police officer's stop of 
his vehicle, claiming that it constituted an unlawful search and 
seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution in that the investigatory stop of his vehicle 
was not supported by "reasonable suspicion." On February 15, 
1996, a Suppression Hearing was conducted before the Honorable 
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Ray M. Harding, Jr. Judge Harding denied defendant's motion to 
suppress. On May 28, 1996, in a bench trial before Judge 
Harding, defendant was convicted of driving under the influence. 
Defendant was sentenced July 15, 1996, and on July 29, 1996, 
defendant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Fourth District 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On March 13, 1995, at approximately 7:20 p.m., Provo City 
Police Officer Brian Moore was on routine patrol in the downtown 
area of Provo (R. 102). At that time he was dispatched to a 
suspicious call in the Albertson's parking lot (Ld.). Officer 
Moore was within four blocks of Albertson's and responded to the 
call in close to a minute's time (R. 101). Dispatch indicated to 
Officer Moore that someone on the pay phone at Albertson's was 
"indicating that they had seen somebody that was intoxicated, and 
they were concerned they were going to drive." (Id.) The 
informant had told dispatch that the suspect was "impaired 
walking." (R. 95) Such information was relayed to Officer Moore 
(Id.). 
When Officer Moore arrived at the parking lot, the 
individual was still on the pay phone with dispatch (Id.). The 
individual got the officer's attention by waving his hands and 
pointing (^ Id.). As Officer Moore approached the informant, the 
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informant hung up the phone and came over towards the vehicle 
(][d.). He pointed, indicating that there was an individual 
walking that had just gotten out of a red camero and was 
returning to the red camero (R. 100-101). The informant believed 
that the man was intoxicated (R. 100). Officer Moore saw the red 
camero, it was the only one in the parking lot (Ixi.). His 
attention was drawn to the vehicle and he felt "like it was 
extremely important to investigate instead of talking with the 
individual any longer." (Id.) After talking with the officer, 
the informant turned around and headed into Albertson's (Id.). 
According to Officer Moore, "the parking lot was really 
congested with people." (R. 99) The congestion forced Officer 
Moore "to go ahead and to drive back around through the parking 
lot in order to come up with this vehicle, because it was about 
four or five cars back." (^ d.) From the location of his police 
car, the officer could not back up because of other vehicles 
(Id.). At this point, when Officer Moore was close to 
defendant's vehicle, he initiated a stop of the vehicle. He 
stated that he "had reasonable suspicion to believe that there 
was possibly an intoxicated person there." (Id.) The vehicle had 
just started to back out of a parking stall when Officer Moore 
operated his overhead lights to detain the vehicle (Id.). 
Officer Moore approached the vehicle and from the plain 
smell of alcohol about the person of the driver was justified to 
continue investigating and subsequently had probable cause to 
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arrest the driver for driving under the influence. The driver 
was identified as defendant Michael Allan. Subsequent testing 
confirmed defendant's blood alcohol level to be above that 
allowed by law for an operator of a vehicle. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Investigative stops by police officers 
constitute seizures and must be justified by reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity. In this case, Officer Moore reasonably 
relied on information given from dispatch and from the informant 
himself. A private citizen called police dispatch and stated 
that he observed a specific person later identified as the 
defendant whom he believed to be intoxicated and who was going to 
drive away. The citizen told dispatch that his belief was based 
on his observation that the defendant was "impaired walking." 
Dispatch relayed this information to Officer Moore. 
Officer Moore responded immediately to the call and talked 
directly with the informant. The officer obtained three specific 
facts from the informant: 1) the specific person, the defendant, 
whom informant had observed and had actually pointed out to the 
officer, 2) the specific vehicle which the defendant was 
approaching, entering, and preparing to drive, namely, a red 
camero, and 3) that the informant believed that the defendant was 
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intoxicated. 
An investigating officer's reasonable suspicion may be based 
on the information of third parties, without independent or 
corroborating observations. Based on the information imparted 
from dispatch, and from the informant, and from the circumstances 
of the situation, Officer Moore initiated an immediate 
investigative stop of the vehicle. The facts and circumstances 
apparent to Officer Moore were sufficient to constitute 
"reasonable suspicion" that defendant was driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Therefore, Officer Moore could initiate an 
investigative stop based upon that reasonable suspicion. The 
trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress 
the evidence from the investigative stop of defendant's vehicle. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT OFFICER 
MOORE HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE 
A. Constitutional and Legal Framework 
In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994), this Court 
outlined the constitutional and legal framework for the inquiry 
into the validity of investigative stops by police officers. 
"[S]topping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute 
a xseizure' within the meaning of the [Fourth and Fourteenth] 
Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and 
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the resulting detention quite brief." Id. at 1276 (quoting 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)). The United States 
Supreme Court set forth a "two-prong test to overcome the Fourth 
Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures. First, 
the officer's initial stop must be justified; second, subsequent 
actions must be within the scope of the circumstances justifying 
the stop." Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)). 
The question presented here, as in Case,/ concerns only the first 
prong: whether the officer was justified in stopping defendant's 
vehicle. Utah codified the Terry rule for investigative stops at 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15, which states that a stop is justified 
if there is "reasonable suspicion to believe [the suspect] has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense . . . ." This Court stated: 
While the required level of suspicion is lower than the 
standard required for probable cause to arrest, the same 
totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to 
determine if there are sufficient "specific and articulable 
facts" to support reasonable suspicion. 
Id. (quoting Terry, 396 U.S. at 21). Furthermore, investigating 
officers "may rely on other sources of information [e.g. 
bulletins, flyers, and dispatches]. An investigative stop may 
survive the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable searches 
and seizures if performed by an officer who objectively relies on 
information." Id. at 1277. Depending on the particular 
circumstances, the officer is not required to obtain additional 
independent or corroborative information. See id. at 1277. 
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B. Officer Moore had a reasonable articulable suspicion based on 
the information imparted from dispatch and from the informant 
Turning to the facts and circumstances of this particular 
case, Officer Moore, relying on information both from dispatch 
and from the informant, was justified in his investigative stop 
of defendant's vehicle based on information relayed by dispatch 
and through communication with the informant himself. 
The specific information relayed to the officer from 
dispatch was that a private citizen "had seen somebody that was 
intoxicated, and [the citizen] was concerned [the defendant] was 
going to drive." (R. 101) The informant was calling from a pay 
phone outside of Albertson's. Dispatch also told Officer Moore 
that the defendant was "impaired walking." (R. 95) 
Officer Moore responded immediately to the call. When he 
arrived at the parking lot, the citizen informant waved his hands 
to get the officer's attention, hung up the phone, and approached 
the officer's vehicle. The officer obtained three specific facts 
from the informant: 1) the specific person, the defendant, whom 
informant had observed and had actually pointed out to the 
officer, 2) the specific vehicle which the defendant was 
approaching, entering, and preparing to drive, namely a red 
camero, and 3) that the informant believed the defendant was 
intoxicated. 
Defendant asserts that "the claimant expressed no 
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information to either dispatch or to Officer Moore as to the 
basis for his belief that Allan was intoxicated." Defendant 
Brief p. 9. Defendant cites and quotes portions of the following 
language of Case: "Merely providing descriptive information to an 
officer about whom to stop, by itself, is not enough to justify 
the stop if there are no articulable facts pointed to which 
establish why a stop was to be made." Case, 884 P.2d at 1278. 
However, in this case, Officer Moore did point to the articulable 
and specific facts noted above. Officer Moore knew both the 
source and the content of the information. See id. at 1279. The 
officer knew "whom to stop" (defendant in the only red camero in 
the parking lot) and "why" to stop him (dispatch had said the 
informant had seen him "impaired walking" and the informant told 
the officer he believed the defendant was intoxicated). Officer 
Moore could reasonably infer that the informant had seen 
defendant's behavior and walking pattern and noted that it was 
"impaired." In this context, "impaired walking" clearly denotes 
unnatural, unbalanced, erratic, unsteady, and/or a host of other 
adjectives describing walking in a way consistent with alcohol 
influence. Officer Moore acted reasonably upon the information he 
received. Officer Moore noted the exigency of the situation and 
the "extreme importance" to investigate (R. 100). The congestion 
of the parking lot with people and cars warranted an immediate 
investigation. Had Officer Moore not directed his attention to 
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the suspect vehicle and stopped it when he did, the vehicle could 
have left and either 1) potential injury to persons in the lot or 
on the street could have occurred or 2) the officer might not 
have been able to catch up to the suspect vehicle, or 3) both. 
C. No independent or corroborating evidence was necessary 
This Court, in Case, stated the following regarding 
independent or corroborating evidence: 
[I]f the investigating officer cannot provide independent or 
corroborating information through his or her own 
observations, the legality of the stop based on information 
imparted by another will depend on the sufficiency of the 
articulable facts known to the individual originating the 
information or bulletin subsequently received and acted upon 
by the investigating officer. 
Id. at 1277. The specific and articulable information given to 
Officer Moore was sufficient to justify an investigative stop of 
defendant's vehicle without the need for independent or 
corroborating observations. 
D. Defendant's reliance on State v. Roth is misplaced 
Defendant looks to State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 
1992), to support his argument that Officer Moore did not have 
reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative stop. See 
Defendant's Brief pp.7-8. 
Although, as Defendant asserts, "the articulated facts 
apparant [sic] to the officer . . . in Roth go far beyond the 
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facts in this case" (see Defendant's Brief p. 8), the inquiry 
must be to the facts and circumstances of this particular case. 
See Case, 884 P.2d at 1276 n.l; see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932, 940 (Utah 1994). First, this case involves communication to 
the officer both from dispatch and from an informant. The 
officer communicated directly with the source of the information, 
thereby confirming the information obtained from dispatch and 
getting additional information as to the suspect and the vehicle. 
There was no concern for "information-laundering." See Case, 884 
P.2d at 1278 n.7 (expressing concern for such abuse as passing 
information through police channels to "validate" otherwise 
"bogus information" or "to secure action based only on police 
hunches"). 
Second, whereas information from security officers may carry 
heightened indicia of reliability, clearly there can be no 
requirement that information must originate from security or law 
enforcement officers or their equivalents to be reliable. The 
Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175 (Utah 1983), 
stated, "Veracity is generally assumed when the information comes 
from an ^average citizen who is in a position to supply 
information by virtue of having been a crime victim or witness.'" 
Id. at 180 (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 3.3 
(1978)). In this case, there was no reason for Officer Moore to 
question the reliability of the citizen informant. The citizen 
on his own volition called dispatch. He gave information 
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regarding his belief that an intoxicated person, whom he had 
observed "impaired walking," was going to drive a vehicle. The 
citizen waved to get the attention of the responding officer, 
approached the officer's car, and gave specific information as to 
the person and the vehicle, again asserting that he believed the 
individual, the defendant, was intoxicated. The citizen 
informant only turned around and went into Albertson's when he 
saw that the officer was going to investigate. Under these 
facts, the information was quite articulable and specific. Such 
information given directly to the officer, made with a physical 
gesture indicating a specific person and vehicle, is as specific 
information as could be given. 
Third, defendant notes that, in upholding the legality of 
the search, the Roth court based its decision in part on the fact 
that "the investigating officer had made personal, articulable 
observations which corroborated the information received from 
dispatch." Defendant's Brief pp.7-8 (citing Roth, 827 P.2d at 
259). As discussed, supra, this Court in Case, two years 
subsequent to Roth, clarified when independent or corroborating 
evidence is necessary to justify an investigative stop of a 
vehicle. The Fourth Amendment does not require the officer to 
obtain corroborating evidence, where the officer relies on 
information given to him, if the person giving the information 
has reasonable articulable suspicion. See Case, 884 P.2d at 1277. 
This standard articulated in Case, supra this brief p.10, is not 
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"new," rather it is a statement of the standard as recognized 
dating prior to the Roth decision. See United States v. Hensley, 
469 U.S. 221, 232-233 (1985); State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 650 
(Utah 1989) ("reliance on [a] flyer or bulletin justifies a stop 
to check identification, to pose questions to the person, or to 
detain the person briefly while attempting to obtain further 
information"). From the facts of Roth, it is clear that such 
corroborating evidence was not necessary to the finding of 
"reasonable suspicion"—its inclusion was mere surplusage. 
Therefore, as stated above, independent or corroborating evidence 
is not necessary where the information imparted to the officer is 
sufficient to warrant "reasonable suspicion" in and of itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the arguments above, Officer Moore's investigative 
stop of defendant Michael Allan's vehicle was supported and 
justified by reasonable suspicion based on specific and 
articulable facts. Therefore, this Court should uphold the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and uphold 
defendant's conviction for Driving Under the Influence. 
DATED this ^fil day of May, 1997. 
srnon F . Roiimey / / Ver  r . nonuxe  /• 
Attorney for Plaihtlff-Appellee 
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